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Marshall and Brown (2006) proposed a Traits as Situational Sensitivities (TASS) Model,
which implies a systematic person × situation interaction. We review this model and
show that it suffers from several limitations. We extend and modify the model in order to
obtain a symmetric pattern of levels and effects for both person and situation factors. Our
suggestions result in a general Nonlinear Interaction of Person and Situation (NIPS) Model.
The NIPS model bears striking similarities to the Rasch model. Based on the symmetric
nature of the NIPS model, we generalize the concept of weak and strong situations to
individuals and propose the concepts of weak and strong persons. Finally, we discuss
psychological mechanisms that might explain the NIPS pattern and offer ideas for future
research.
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Marshall and Brown (2006) proposed a Traits as Situational
Sensitivities (TASS) model, which addresses an important issue
that each theory of behavior has to address: How do personality
and situational factors jointly shape behavior? The TASS model
is a person × situation interaction model. Like all person ×
situation interaction models, it challenges the assumption that
personality and situational factors influence behavior additively.
The TASS model assumes a characteristic type of deviation from
additivity, and thus a specific person × situation interaction.
Marshall and Brown (2006) use aggression as an example to
illustrate their model. The aggression literature has achieved the
consensus that aggressive behavior in a given situation is a func-
tion of aggression-related personality traits and the potential of
the situation to provoke this kind of behavior (cf. Bettencourt
et al., 2006). Less agreement has been obtained with regard to how
the two factors interact to shape behavior. Marshall and Brown
(2006) assume a particular form of that interaction: According to
their model, situational effects among lower levels of provocation
are stronger for highly trait-aggressive individuals, whereas sit-
uational effects among higher levels of provocation are stronger
for individuals low in trait aggressiveness. Thus, depending on
their level of trait aggressiveness, individuals differ in their situ-
ational sensitivity; hence, the model’s name. Figure 1 displays the
original TASS pattern [adopted fromMarshall and Brown (2006),
Figure 1A]1.
1Note that Figure 1 and the remaining figures represent relations between
independent and dependent variables schematically. Therefore, the figures do
not contain scale units. The scales may differ between substantive applica-
tions of the model and between measures of the variables to which the model
Although the basic idea of the TASSmodel is appealing and has
provided progress in understanding the joint impact of person
and situation factors on behavior, we argue that the particular way
it was formulated by Marshall and Brown (2006) rests on three
assumptions that are not fully convincing: (a)Whereas situational
effects are assumed to be nonlinear across trait levels, trait effects
are assumed to be linear across situation levels. (b) People low in
trait aggressiveness are assumed to be unaffected by a moderate
provocation. (c) Trait effects are assumed to be virtually zero in
situations high in aggression-provocation.
In the first part of this article, we will discuss these assumptions
and conclude that they are not sufficiently plausible. In the second
part, we will show that the basic idea of the TASS model can be
retained by adding a few modifications to it. These modifications
led us to propose a general Nonlinear Interaction of Person and
Situation (NIPS) model. In the third part of our article, we will
introduce the striking similarities between the NIPS model and
the Rasch model. By relating the basic ideas of the NIPS model
to the psychometric concepts of item difficulty and personality
effects, we will propose the concept of weak and strong persons.
Finally, in the fourth part, we will address psychological mech-
anisms that might explain the NIPS pattern. We will offer some
ideas about such mechanisms.
is applied. Therefore, the values labeled “low,” “moderate,” and “high” do not
represent well-defined points on a scale. Rather, they indicate ranges on the
scale that measure the constructs according to Marshall and Brown (2006)
or constructs of other applications of the TASS model. Only the ordinates of
Figures 4, 5 are well-defined. They represent the probability scale that ranges
from 0 to 1.
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FIGURE 1 | The original TASS model [adopted from Marshall and
Brown (2006), Figure 1A].
THREE PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TASS MODEL
ARE LINEAR TRAIT EFFECTS CONSISTENTWITH THE CORE PREMISES
OF TASS?
Marshall and Brown (2006) specified three levels of the situa-
tion factor but only two levels of the person factor. Because an
empirical test of nonlinear effects requires at least three levels, the
design chosen by Marshall and Brown allows for nonlinear situ-
ation effects but not for nonlinear trait effects. Thus, the authors
seem to assume that trait effects are linear. This means that within
a given situation containing a particular level of provocation, each
increase in trait level yields a constant increase in aggression. Such
a linearity assumption, however, is not consistent with the TASS
model’s interpretation of TASS, and this suggests that trait lev-
els can be conceptualized as individual differences in thresholds
for perceiving a situation as a provocation. Highly trait-aggressive
individuals have a low threshold for interpreting a situation as a
provocation. Moderately trait-aggressive individuals have a mod-
erate threshold, and people low in trait aggressiveness have a high
threshold. Whether or not two individuals who differ in trait
aggressiveness by a given amount react with a similar or with a
different degree of aggression depends on the provocation level
of a given situation. If the provocation level is below the thresh-
olds of both persons, they will react similarly (i.e., with no or
little aggression). If the provocation level is above the threshold of
both persons, they will also react similarly (i.e., with some aggres-
sion). However, if the provocation level is below the threshold of
person A and above the threshold of person B, they will react
differently. Person A will react with no or very little aggression;
person B with some or much. Hence, the trait effect cannot be the
same across situations that differ in level of provocation. Thus, by
implication, linear trait effects are inconsistent with the core idea
of TASS.
ARE LOW TRAIT-AGGRESSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNAFFECTED BY A
MODERATE PROVOCATION?
The TASSmodel assumes that the difference between the nonpro-
voking and the moderately provoking situations is zero for indi-
viduals low in trait aggressiveness (see Figure 1). This assumption
is not plausible, and it is also not in agreement with Marshall and
Brown (2006) own data: In all three studies, low trait-aggressive
individuals reported more anger in the moderately provoking sit-
uation than in the nonprovoking situation. This difference was
significant in Studies 2 (cf. Marshall and Brown, 2006, p. 1106)
and 3 (cf. Marshall and Brown, 2006, p. 1108).
ARE TRAIT EFFECTS VIRTUALLY ZERO IN STRONGLY-PROVOKING
SITUATIONS?
A third assumption of the TASS model is that trait effects are very
small at both ends of the situational continuum (see Figure 1).
Whereas this seems likely for nonprovoking situations, it appears
doubtful in strongly provoking situations. Again, Marshall and
Brown (2006) data are not consistent with their assumption. High
trait-aggressive individuals reported significantly more anger as
compared to low trait-aggressive individuals in the strong provo-
cation condition. This difference was significant in all three stud-
ies (cf. Marshall and Brown, 2006, p. 1104 for Study 1, p. 1107 for
Study 2, and p. 1108 for Study 3).
FROM TASS TO NIPS
We propose that slight modifications to the TASSmodel can rem-
edy its weaknesses and inconsistencies. Our modifications are
fivefold and transform the TASS model into the NIPS model.
The first modification deals with Marshall and Brown (2006)
choice of nonprovoking situations as representing the lowest
level of the situation factor. Cooper and Withey (2009) argue
that testing person × situation interactions requires great care
in pairing situations and personality constructs (p. 69). More
specifically, they request the choice of situations that are func-
tionally equivalent to the personality constructs at hand. In
line with this quest for functional equivalence, we argue that
choosing a zero level of provocation is disadvantageous because
situations containing a zero level of provocation may differ qual-
itatively from situations with moderate to high provocation lev-
els. Thus, nonprovoking situations cannot be mapped onto the
same underlying quantitative dimension as situations contain-
ing at least some level of provocation. Therefore, we replace
the nonprovoking situation by a situation that contains a low
level of provocation. The second modification changes the label-
ing of the situational levels. In order to avoid confusion with
Mischel (1973) concept of weak vs. strong situations, the sit-
uation originally labeled “strong” will be renamed “high.” The
thirdmodification addresses the problematic assumption that low
trait-aggressive individuals are unaffected by a moderate provo-
cation. Instead, we assume that a moderate provocation level (as
compared to a low provocation level) will have at least some
effect on all individuals, including those low on trait aggressive-
ness. The fourth modification is that we allow for nonlinear trait
effects. This requires a third level of the trait factor. Consequently,
we add a moderate trait level. The fifth modification is that
we allow for larger trait effects among low and high situational
provocations.
The pattern that follows from our transformation of the
TASS model into the NIPS model is depicted in Figures 2, 3.
Figure 2 displays the situation factor on the X-axis, whereas
the three trait levels are displayed as separate lines. Figure 3
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FIGURE 2 | The NIPS model with three trait levels.
FIGURE 3 | The NIPS model after exchanging the formal status of
situational provocation and trait aggressiveness.
displays the trait factor on the X-axis, whereas the three situ-
ational levels are displayed as separate lines. Whereas Figure 2
shows that the effect of situational provocation on aggres-
sion cannot be generalized across levels of trait aggressive-
ness, Figure 3 shows that the effect of trait aggressiveness on
aggression cannot be generalized across levels of situational
provocation.
SYMMETRICAL INTERACTION PATTERNS
Unlike the TASS model, the NIPS model allows for a
symmetrical person × situation interaction. A two-way inter-
action is symmetrical if both ways of depicting the interac-
tion (one factor on the abscissa and the other as separate
lines) yield an identical pattern (cf. Figures 2, 3). Figure 2
is entirely in line with the basic premise of the TASS
model: The difference between low and moderate provoca-
tions is larger for high trait-aggressive individuals (as compared
to low trait-aggressive individuals), whereas the difference
between moderate and high provocations is larger for low
trait-aggressive individuals (as compared to high trait-aggressive
individuals).
Due to the symmetrical nature of the NIPS model, the non-
linearity of the situation effect (Figure 2) is mirrored by the
nonlinearity of the trait effect (Figure 3). Nonlinear effects of
trait aggressiveness across situations are, as we have argued earlier,
conceptually implied by the threshold notion of TASS. Thus, the
pattern of the NIPSmodel is certainly in agreement with Marshall
and Brown (2006) core ideas and follows them through to their
logical conclusion.
Note that the possibility of a symmetrical person × situa-
tion interaction is precluded by the TASS model because such
an interaction pattern requires that trait effects at low and high
points on the situation dimension are equally as large as situa-
tion effects at low and high points on the trait dimension. The
TASS model, however, assumes that trait effects are virtually zero
at low and high points on the situation dimension. Marshall
and Brown (2006) do not offer convincing theoretical reasons
for this assumption. Moreover, the asymmetric pattern of the
TASS model is not in agreement with a prominent psychomet-
ric model, the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960, 1961). As we will show
next, this model matches the NIPS model closely but not the
TASS model.
RELATING THE NIPS MODEL TO PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY
AND PSYCHOMETRIC CONCEPTS
LINKING THE NIPS MODEL TO THE RASCHMODEL
A link between the NIPS model and the Rasch model seems
possible because psychometric theories imply models that serve
the same purpose that person × situation models are designed
for. Just like the TASS model and the NIPS model, psychome-
tric theories describe the functional relation between a behav-
ior and the causes of that behavior. We propose that unlike
the TASS model, the NIPS model can be easily linked to the
Rasch model. This is true because, unlike the effect pattern
of the TASS model, the effect pattern of the NIPS model is
highly similar to the characteristic curve of the Rasch model.
We claim that this similarity adds to the plausibility of the NIPS
model.
The Rasch model describes how the probability of solving
a task (e.g., an item from an intelligence test) simultaneously
depends on the item’s difficulty and the person’s ability. Item
difficulty and person ability are conceived of as continuous vari-
ables that can be projected onto the same interval scale. Solving
vs. not solving an item is a binary event. According to the
Rasch model, such an event cannot linearly depend on item
difficulty, nor can it linearly depend on person ability. Item
Characteristic Curves (ICC) describe how the probability of solv-
ing an item depends on both the item’s difficulty and on the
ability of the person considered. These concepts—item diffi-
culty and person ability—originate from ability testing. Given
their formal definition, however, these concepts can be applied
to any psychological domain in addition to ability. The litera-
ture contains a large number of successful applications of the
Rasch model and extensions of this model to a variety of psy-
chological constructs (e.g., for personality assessment; Reise and
Waller, 1990; Chernyshenko et al., 2001). Figure 4 presents the
www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 499 | 3
Schmitt et al. Nonlinear Interaction of Person and Situation
ICCs of two items, Situation A and Situation B, the former having
a higher level of provocation than the latter. 2 Figure 5 depicts
Person Characteristic Curves (PCCs) for two people who dif-
fer in trait aggressiveness (for further information on the Rasch
Model, ICC, and PCC, see, e.g., Lord, 1980; Embretson and Reise,
2000).
Ignoring for the moment that the dependent variables of the
NIPSmodel and the Raschmodel have different scales, the former
being an intensity scale and the latter being a probability scale, a
striking similarity can be observed when comparing Figures 2, 5.
In both figures, the difference in the degree or in the likeli-
hood of aggression between a person high in trait aggressiveness
and a person low in trait aggressiveness is smaller in situations
2On ability tests, easy items are items that have a higher probability of
endorsement, even by people with low ability, and are thus located on the
left side of the ability scale. Items that are more difficult have a low probabil-
ity of being endorsed until a person has a higher ability level, and thus, these
items are located further to the right on the ability scale. Transferring this
idea to the domain of aggression explains why “Situation A: High provocation
level” is located on the left side of the scale—because it does not take much
trait aggressiveness (or “ability”) in this situation to act aggressively with some
probability. Likewise, “Situation B: Low provocation level” is analogous to the
difficult item, and is thus located on the right side of the scale where it takes a
higher level of trait aggressiveness to have some probability of responding in
this situation.
FIGURE 4 | Item characteristic curves of two situations differing in
degree of provocation.
FIGURE 5 | Person characteristic curves of two individuals differing in
trait aggressiveness.
that have either a low or a high provocation level as compared
to moderately provoking situations. The same similarity can be
observed when comparing Figures 3, 4. In these two figures, the
difference in the degree or in the likelihood of aggression between
a situation low in provocation level and a situation high in provo-
cation level is smaller for people who are either high or low in trait
aggressiveness as compared to people with a moderate level of
trait aggressiveness. These similarities become even more obvious
when we integrate the NIPS model and the Rasch model graph-
ically into Figures 6, 7. These figures also demonstrate that the
expected levels of aggression for individuals with a moderate trait
aggressiveness level and for situations with a moderate provoca-
tion level fit the corresponding ogives (i.e., curves) of the Rasch
model well.
One might object that the binary behavior scale of the Rasch
model (displaying aggression vs. not displaying aggression) and
the interval behavior scale of the NIPSmodel (intensity of aggres-
sion) prohibit a direct comparison of the two models. This is true,
of course, in a formal sense. However, the basic idea and purpose
of the Rasch model may enhance one’s understanding of the NIPS
pattern, and this is why linking the two models on a conceptual
level is fruitful. The Rasch model was proposed to handle the pre-
diction of behavior that is limited in range. The very same reasons
(i.e., limits to the range of the intensity or frequency of behavior)
may also explain data patterns that are consistent with the NIPS
FIGURE 6 | Integrating person characteristic curves into the NIPS
model.
FIGURE 7 | Integrating situation characteristic curves into the NIPS
model.
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model. In fact, this seems highly likely because most psychological
variables are not endless but are instead limited in range. These
limits do not need to be artifacts resulting from tailored scales.
Rather, they may be due to biological/physiological limits, social
limits, or limits imposed by the person via self-control.
Many examples could be given for such limits. In monopo-
lar constructs (e.g., anxiety or aggression), the lower bound of
the behavior scale is obvious because it is defined by the total
absence of the relevant behavior. Moreover, it is also reasonable
to assume that both the frequency and the intensity of behaviors
have upper bounds. If we measure aggression as the intensity of
punching an object or another person, there certainly is an upper
intensity limit. If we measure spider phobia as the speed at which
a person runs away from spiders, there clearly is a biologically
determined upper limit to the scale as well.
Upper boundaries of behavior variables do not originate only
from biological causes. They might also be invoked by social fac-
tors and self-regulation processes. Many extreme behaviors such
as aggression meet with social disapproval because they devi-
ate from a social norm. Because people are generally aware of
social norms, are able to anticipate the negative consequences of
violating these norms, and are motivated to avoid negative con-
sequences, they engage in self-control and self-regulation. Quite
often, avoiding negative consequences can be achieved only by
behaving within the limits set by a norm.
Of course, these examples do not cover the entire spectrum
of human behavior, but they are examples that illustrate the idea
that both the intensity and the frequency of behavior often can-
not vary endlessly. Whenever this is true, the NIPS model will be
superior to models that assume additive linear effects. It is obvi-
ous, however, that the NIPS model is a simplification, as every
model is. Various extensions and refinements are possible and
plausible. It is possible, for example, that not every person will
be affected by the limits named above to the same extent. The
upper limits could be given by the degree of norm internalization
or self-control. This would mean that the thresholds could vary
from person to person in a systematic way. We do not want to
ignore these potentially interesting mechanisms, but we present
the model in its simplest form to avoid making it too complex.
WEAK AND STRONG SITUATIONS
Marshall and Brown (2006) have linked their model to the con-
cept of weak and strong situations (e.g., Mischel, 1973; Price
and Bouffard, 1974). Strong situations can be defined as situa-
tions in which individual differences in behavior are restricted,
for instance due to norms, conventions, and rituals. Strong situa-
tions trigger uniform behavior. Very few people deviate from the
norm. By contrast, weak situations can be defined as situations in
which individual differences in behavior are unrestricted because
no standardizing norm is salient. Marshall and Brown apply this
concept to aggressive behavior as a response to different levels of
situational provocations. They implicitly argue that very low and
very high provocation levels are special cases of strong situations.
This is why they assume that trait effects will be virtually zero in
these conditions (see Figure 1).
In psychometric terms, a situation containing low levels of
provocation would be a difficult item because almost nobody will
behave aggressively. A situation containing high levels of provo-
cation would be an easy item because many people will react
aggressively. Because the interindividual variability of behavior
is reduced in strong situations, these situations cannot discrim-
inate between people as effectively as weak situations can. This
principle is well known in psychometrics. Very easy and very dif-
ficult items are less able to discriminate between individuals than
moderately difficult items.
Figure 8 integrates the concepts and principles we have dis-
cussed. First, Figure 8 shows how weak and strong situations
are related to easy and difficult items. Second, Figure 8 shows
that difficult and easy items have little discriminative power
(low item-total correlations) as compared to moderately difficult
items. This again corresponds with Item Response Theory. Each
ICC possesses an item information function that has the same
shape that we assume for the discriminative power of situations
(cf. Lord, 1980). Third, Figure 8 shows that the impact of person-
ality traits on behavior, sometimes called the personality effect,
depends monotonically on the strength of the situation. Given
the curvilinear relation between the strength of a situation and
its difficulty, the impact of personality traits on behavior is also
curvilinearly correlated with the difficulty of situations.
WEAK AND STRONG PERSONS
Weak vs. strong situations generate only one among several pos-
sible person × situation interaction patterns. If extreme, they
may prohibit any trait effect. A provocation may be so strong
(psychometrically easy) that everybody reacts aggressively to it.
Other (psychometrically difficult) situations may contain so lit-
tle provocation that nobody reacts aggressively. Thus, combining
extremely strong and extremely weak situations implies that the
situation shapes the magnitude of trait effects.
Now let us consider a different person × situation interaction
model that makes entirely different predictions. In this interac-
tion model, personality shapes the magnitude of situation effects
such that the possible range of situation effects is determined
by the person’s trait score (and not vice versa). In psychomet-
ric terms, we might speak of strong and weak persons (instead
of situations). Strong persons display little intraindividual differ-
ences in behavior across situations. Very low and very high trait
FIGURE 8 | Links between the concepts of situation strength, item
difficulty, personality effect, and item-total correlation.
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levels are special cases of strong persons.3 For example, people who
are extremely low in trait-aggressiveness may respond nonag-
gressively regardless of how much they are provoked. People
extremely high in trait-aggressiveness may respond aggressively
regardless of how little they are provoked. By contrast, moder-
ately trait-aggressive individuals may show considerable variation
in aggressive responding across a range of different provocation
levels. Thus, people with moderate trait levels represent weak per-
sons. Figure 9 demonstrates how person strength, the trait level,
and the situation effect are related to each other.4 Note that such a
model makes entirely different predictions than the TASS model.
The TASS model makes clear assumptions regarding the relative
strength of person and situation effects. It assumes that situations
shape the magnitude of trait effects, but not vice versa. However,
Marshall and Brown (2006) own data are not fully consistent with
this assumption.
3Note that extreme trait levels are not the only possible reason for why a per-
son’s behavioral variability will be smaller than the behavioral variability of
other individuals. People may also display little trans-situational variability
in behavior due to other factors such as self-monitoring (Snyder and Tanke,
1976; Snyder, 1987), self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), need for
closure (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), preference for consistency or other
metatraits (Bem and Allen, 1974; Baumeister and Tice, 1988), and mod-
erators of consistency that have been identified (Snyder and Ickes, 1985).
Individuals with high scores on these traits are also strong persons, although
their scores on the target trait might not be extreme. Nevertheless, there is
clear empirical evidence that shows that trait extremity is inversely related
to cross-situational variability (Jackson and Paunonen, 1985; Baumeister and
Tice, 1988; Paunonen, 1988). Therefore, it seems safe to say that people with
very low and very high trait scores are strong persons, although individuals
may differ in cross-situational variability in behavior for additional reasons.
4Trait-aggressiveness does not appear to fit neatly into the “weak” vs. “strong”
situation framework. In a recent meta-analysis, Bettencourt et al. (2006)
showed that trait-aggressiveness actually predicts aggressive behavior regard-
less of the level of situational provocation. In other words, trait-aggressiveness
yields main effects, but interactions with situational provocations are much
less frequent. Other traits such as impulsivity, emotional susceptibility, or
narcissism yielded much larger interactions with situational variations.
FIGURE 9 | Links between the concepts of person strength, person
ability or trait level, and situation effect.
The NIPS model reconciles the two kinds of person × situa-
tion interaction models: It assumes that the range of trait effects
is smaller for low and high levels of the situation factor, and
it also assumes that the range of situation effects is smaller for
high and low levels of the trait factor. The pattern depicted in
Figures 2, 3 suggests that the way situations shape the magni-
tude of trait effects is identical to the way personality shapes the
magnitude of situation effects. This symmetry assumption is well
in line with the Rasch model, and the Rasch model has received
empirical support in many applications.
It is important to understand that the interactive quality of
the NIPS model results from the conditional nature of both trait
effects and situation effects. All trait effects and all situation effects
are conditional effects. The strength of a situation effect (differ-
ence in behavior between two situations) always depends on the
trait level. Accordingly, the strength of a trait effect (difference in
behavior between two persons) always depends of the situation
level. Interactions are defined as differences between differences.
In the NIPS model, differences between situations differ between
persons. Accordingly, differences between persons differ between
situations.
EXPLANATORY CAPACITIES OF THE NIPS MODEL
Just like the TASS model, the NIPS model is a descriptive model.
Neither model specifies the psychological mechanisms that cause
the patterns of behavior they predict. However, combining these
models with substantive theory can bestow explanatory capac-
ity upon them. Marshall and Brown (2006) propose the general
threshold concept as an explanation for this. The threshold con-
cept has two limits, however. First, it is not an explanatory con-
cept. Second, it cannot explain why initial differences in behavior
between individuals become increasingly larger as we move from
difficult to moderately difficult situations. It is also not able to
explain why individual differences in behavior become smaller
again as we move from moderately difficult situations to easy
situations. These properties of the NIPS model would require
complementing the threshold concept with the concept of thresh-
olds for the perception of differences between situations. However,
even adding these thresholds would not satisfy the need for sub-
stantive explanations. What theories might contain explanations
for the NIPS pattern?
Synergy is one concept that might help generate substan-
tive explanations for person × situation interactions (Schmitt
et al., 2003). The term synergy, derived from systems theory (Von
Bertalanffy, 1968), denotes a conceptual or mathematical prod-
uct of functionally equivalent factors and is used both in basic
(biology, chemistry, physics) and applied sciences (medicine,
pharmacy, meteorology) as a general explanation of nonlinear
effects and change. In biology, for instance, synergy means that
the overall effect (e.g., on the growth of a biological structure)
of several factors (e.g., hormones or nutrition) is larger than the
sum of their single effects. Factors are considered functionally
equivalent if they affect an outcome variable such as behavior or
change similarly and are thus exchangeable. Applied to aggres-
sive behavior, trait aggressiveness and situational provocation
are functionally equivalent because they both affect aggressive
behavior.
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In fact, synergistic interactions that account for the diverging
part of the slopes of the NIPS model as shown in Figures 2, 3
have been assumed in state-trait anxiety theory and state-trait
anger theories as proposed by Endler (1975) and Spielberger
(1972). They have also been demonstrated in other psycholog-
ical domains such as justice judgment and behavior (Schmitt
et al., 2003; Schmitt and Sabbagh, 2004). Several psychological
principles have been proposed for explaining synergistic interac-
tions, the most influential being schema theory (Markus, 1977).
Schemas filter and guide information processing such as atten-
tion, information search, memory, and complex inferences like
causal attributions. Because the availability and accessibility of
schemas vary with underlying personality traits, information is
processed in amanner that is congruent with these traits (Rusting,
1998). Persons high in a certain trait detect minimal trait-
congruent characteristics in ambiguous situations due to selective
attention and selective information search. They givemore weight
to trait-congruent information in judgment and decision pro-
cesses than to irrelevant or incongruent information also available
in an ambiguous situation. Highly trait-anxious individuals, for
instance, selectively attend to threatening information and put
more weight on threat signals than on security signals. As a conse-
quence, they are not only alarmed earlier than individuals low in
trait anxiety but also react more strongly to situations that differ
in threat (Endler, 1975). Highly aggressive individuals, to provide
a second example, have schemas that include a hostile attribu-
tion bias (Dodge, 1980). They tend to interpret a disturbing but
ambiguous event more readily as the consequence of purposeful
behavior and thus as a provocation. Consequently, they are prone
to respond to slight provocations with counter-aggressive and
retaliatory acts. In addition to anxiety and aggression, justice sen-
sitivity can be given as a third and more recent example. Several
studies have shown that justice sensitive individuals selectively
attend to justice-related cues in a situation of potential injustice
and tend to interpret ambiguous situations as just or unjust based
on these cues. As a consequence, they react more strongly with
justice-related emotion (anger, outrage, guilt) and behavior such
as compensating innocent victims and punishing perpetrators
(Baumert and Schmitt, 2009; Baumert et al., 2011, 2012).
The mechanisms that turn a synergistic or conjunctive inter-
action (diverging slopes in Figures 2, 3) into a disjunctive inter-
action (converging slopes in Figures 2, 3) have been addressed
less often in the literature. From the perspective of general system
theory (Von Bertalanffy, 1968) and the principle of homeostasis,
one might argue that the turn from a synergistic into a disjunctive
interaction is inevitable for preventing the system from exploding
or falling out of balance. This process seems particularly plausi-
ble for systems that would suffer damage from states that exceed
the boundaries within which the system functions properly. This
reasoning is consistent with our earlier suggestion that biologi-
cal characteristics and social norms place limits on the frequency
and intensity of behavior. Most likely, however, these are not the
only mechanisms. The schema concept that has been employed
for explaining synergistic interactions may also explain why this
interaction turns into a disjunctive interaction at a certain point
on the difficulty scale of situations.
The application of schema theory to the disjunctive part of the
NIPS interaction seems possible if we make three assumptions.
First, we assume that a cognitive schema works like a pattern
recognition tool: A critical number of elements that define the
pattern have to be identified before the Gestalt of the pattern will
be recognized. Second, we assume that a difficult situation con-
tains fewer or less obvious indications of the elements that define
the pattern. Accordingly, easy situations contain more or more
obvious indications of critical elements. Third, we assume that
individuals high on a trait have more sensitive and finely tuned
schemas and will, for this reason, more easily recognize and com-
bine the elements of a pattern. Combining all three assumptions
implies that the situation schemas of individuals high on the trait
will become saturated relatively quickly compared to individuals
low on the trait. For people low on the trait, more obvious indi-
cations or a larger number of them are necessary to activate the
schema, and this ismore likely to happen in easy situations than in
difficult ones. For people high on the trait, additional information
contained in easy situations is redundant because their schema
can be fully activated with a smaller number and less obvious
indications of critical elements. Additional information at a cer-
tain point cannot increase the degree of activation of a specific
schema. This idea is speculative. However, it is consistent with the
NIPS model and adds an explanatory component to this model.
Moreover, it is a parsimonious idea because it can explain both
parts of the person × situation interaction (i.e., its synergistic or
conjunctive part and its disjunctive part).
In fact, preliminary evidence from our justice sensitivity
research mentioned earlier is consistent with our reasoning. Yet
unpublished data show that priming participants with unfairness
can have a weaker effect on justice-related emotion and behavior
for highly justice insensitive individuals compared to individ-
uals with low justice sensitivity. This pattern suggests that for
highly justice sensitive individuals, schemas of justice-related sit-
uations and events are chronically accessible and therefore cannot
be made much more accessible by situational cues.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
More research is needed before the NIPS model can be accepted
as a general person × situation interaction model of behavior.
Future research has to solve several questions, some of which will
be addressed in this last section of our paper.
HOW CANWE MEASURE AND DEFINE STRONG ANDWEAK PERSONS
AND SITUATIONS?
First, future research has to find and systematically compare
strategies that can be used to measure the strength of persons
and situations (Cooper and Withey, 2009). Assuming that strong
persons are those with extremely high or low trait levels, the
measurement of person strength seems straightforward at first
glance. However, in taking a closer look at the way psychol-
ogists measure traits, a problem becomes obvious. The items
of many personality questionnaires describe behavior in situ-
ations. The item “If somebody hits me, I hit back” from the
Buss and Perry (1992) Aggression Questionnaire serves as a good
example. Items like these raise several important questions. How
can we independentlymeasure the three components of the NIPS:
person, situation, and behavior?Will themodel become circular if
the components are not measured independently? Funder (2006)
notion of the personality triad may help answer these questions.
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He states that each of the triad’s components—person, situa-
tion, and behavior—has to be understood in terms of the other
two. If they are inseparable, each of them has to be measured by
taking the other two into account. Does this strategy make the
NIPS model circular? We do not believe so because the nonlinear
shape of the interrelation is not an implication of their functional
interdependence in Funder’s personality triad.
Any empirical test of the NIPS model requires at least three
levels of the situation factor. If we assume that situation factors
are metric in nature, as was assumed in the studies conducted by
Marshall and Brown (2006), then a proper scaling of the situation
variable is crucial. For example, how can we define low, moderate,
and high levels of situational provocation? From the perspective
of the personality triad, this is possible in the same way in which
we measure trait levels. Trait levels represent averages of behavior
across many situations. Accordingly, situation levels can be mea-
sured by averaging the behavior of individuals. This is in fact the
way item difficulties are defined in psychometrics. Note that both
strategies of measuring trait level and situation level do not imply
a specific shape of the functional relation between behavior level,
trait level, and situation level. Thus, the NIPS model can be tested
using the personality triad as defined by Funder (2006) and as
employed in recent empirical studies (e.g., Sherman et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, we are not saying that aggregating the behavior of
people is the only or best way of measuring the situation level. In
fact, we have used other strategies in our own research and will
describe these briefly in the next section.
HOWMUCH EMPIRICAL SUPPORT HAS THE NIPS MODEL RECEIVED
SO FAR?
We have started with empirically testing the NIPS model in the
domains of aggression, jealousy, and well-being. The results of
our first studies are encouraging. In light of the recent debate on
the replicability and generalizability of findings (Asendorpf et al.,
2013), however, we feel that more research is needed before safe
conclusions about the validity of the NIPS model can be drawn.
Importantly, additional studies should not come solely from our
lab. Rather, it seems crucial for the credibility of findings and
validity of the NIPS model that other research groups also sub-
mit it to empirical tests. Making this possible was the main reason
for our decision to publish the model in a theoretical paper at this
point.
Our first studies were aimed at comparing different meth-
ods of scaling situations. A first method was inspired by schema
theory and consisted of varying the number of relevant hints sug-
gesting that a situation has a certain quality (being provocative)
and a certain intensity of that quality (degree of provocative-
ness). A second strategy employed expert ratings of the quality
and intensity (levels) of situations (cf. Wilkowski et al., 2007).
This approach corresponds to what is known as stimulus scal-
ing in psychometrics. As a third strategy, we aggregated the
behavior of persons in situations according to the personality
triad framework. This method corresponds to what is known as
response scaling in psychometrics.
These few examples from our ongoing research show that we
consider our model to be a general person× situation interaction
model that is not limited to a few constructs but rather applicable
to a large spectrum of behavioral domains. Nevertheless, person
× situation interactionsmay bemore pronounced in some behav-
ioral domains than in others. In other words, the type of construct
or behavior may be a moderator that determines the overall
strength of person × situation interactions. Identifying these
moderators would be a valuable task for future research.
WHAT ARE THE PSYCHOLOGICALMECHANISMS BEHIND THE NIPS
PATTERN?
Our brief analysis suggests that although the model might be a
general and robust model on the descriptive level, several biolog-
ical and psychological mechanisms might be responsible for the
characteristic pattern. In our justice sensitivity research, we found
preliminary evidence for the schema account we suggested earlier
as a possible mechanism that can explain both the diverging and
the converging parts of the interaction. However, more studies
that systematically combine trait levels of justice sensitivity with
levels of situational injustice are needed before our first results can
be considered to be robust.
Most likely, more mechanisms besides the few we have pro-
posed can explain the NIPS pattern. We would like to encourage
other researchers to link the NIPS model with the psychological
mechanisms they are studying, and we are looking forward to see-
ing if parts of their data fit with the NIPS model. This leads us to
the last question we want to address.
HOW CAN THE NIPS MODEL BE USED IN FUTURE RESEARCH?
We suggest and hope that the NIPS model will provide a com-
mon framework for scholars who conduct research in social
psychology and personality psychology. Because the model is a
general model that can be applied in principle to a wide range
of traits, situations, and behavioral domains, the model may pro-
vide a simple but common language for personality researchers
and social psychologists alike. The concepts of strong vs. weak
persons and situations as well as the nonlinear interaction pat-
tern of the model may facilitate communication among scholars
from different research areas. The model may also contribute
to the comparison of results from different studies and serve as
a common framework for meta-analyses on person × situation
interactions.
Next, the NIPS model may help to resolve inconsistencies
among findings from different studies. According to the model,
inconsistent findings may result from a limited range of trait lev-
els and situation levels. Depending on the range of trait levels and
the range of situation levels that were combined in a study, either
conjunctive or disjunctive interactions may result if the model
fits the data. Without considering the full pattern of the NIPS
model, such findings could easily be mistaken as inconsistent or
even contradictory. However, they might be fully consistent with
the NIPS model and therefore also consistent among each other
as well. Reanalyses of data that were considered to be inconsistent
up to nowmay show that the data are in line with the NIPSmodel.
In this case, these data would no longer appear to be inconsistent
but rather will be viewed as coherent and conclusive.
The NIPS model can also be used to clarify the polarity of
traits. The data pattern presented in this paper is the one to
be expected for unipolar constructs. Bipolar constructs should
reveal the same data pattern twice (with one part being the mirror
inversion of the other). Testing the unipolar version of the model
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against the bipolar version in a specific application can thus con-
tribute to the empirical clarification of the polarity of a construct.
We hope that these examples will encourage readers to con-
sider the application of the NIPS model to their own research
questions and data. For the sake of replication, we look forward
to applications of the NIPS model to the constructs of our own
work in progress (aggression, jealousy, well-being, justice). We
also hope for applications to other behavioral domains because
only a substantive diversity of applications can shed light on the
generalizability of the NIPS model.
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